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Abstract 
Using France and the UK as case studies, this paper discusses how the focus of groups opposed to European 
integration has changed over time. Such groups often claim to have a generalised or ideological opposition to 
the European Union, but in practice it is apparent that particular issues arouse most attention. The article covers 
the period since the mid-1980s, to show how the relative importance of different elements has changed over 
time, both for anti-EU group formation and changes in groups’ activities. Most notably, this change has been 
informed by two key factors. Firstly, an incomplete (or biased) view of the EU system repeatedly draws groups’ 
attention to otherwise minor topics, often taking them to be symbolic of wider developments (e.g. harmonisation 
of standards). Secondly, groups’ interest is highest in projects when they are not fully decided (e.g. membership 
of the Euro or the constitutionalisation process since Laeken). The overall picture that emerges is one of groups 
rationally concentrating their efforts on targets that offer the most unambiguous case for an alternative policy at 
the point of greatest leverage in the policy-making cycle. This underlines the dynamic nature of opposition to 
the EU and the fundamental link between that opposition and the EU itself. 
Keywords 
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It is tempting to think of those opposed to the European integration process as an 
uninformed and undifferentiated group of people, a thought best summed up in the 
pejorative connotations in the overly reductive term ‘eurosceptic’. However, such an 
approach is clearly an over-generalisation, something noted by most academics working 
in the field (see Taggart & Szczerbiak 2001; Kopecky & Mudde 2002; Flood 2002; 
Skinner 2010; Vasilopoulou 2011). Just as there is recognition that not all opponents of 
the European Union (EU) are the same, so too there needs to be a more careful 
appreciation of the evolutionary development and adaptation of those involved. At its 
most basic, this requires some sense of change over time, as individuals and groups 
move in and out of various taxonomical categories. But it also requires some 
understanding of how the objectives, strategies and tactics of anti-EU groups have 
changed in of themselves: this article is directed at making just such a contribution. 
The article focuses its attention on those organised groups within civil society that 
express positions of active opposition to the EU. This definition has two parts. Firstly, it 
encompasses both political parties and non-party groups, considering both to be 
important parts of the mobilisation and conduct of public debate: the latter have been 
largely ignored by researchers to date (Koopmans 2007 and FitzGibbon 2013 are 
exceptions). Secondly, it sets a threshold for inclusion of active opposition, and so is 
tight enough to exclude more overtly opportunistic elements, those for whom scepticism 
is little more than a sideshow to their primary goals. In both these elements, the 
resultant sets of groups can justifiably be described as the effective anti-EU movement 
within their respective countries. 
While such movements extend beyond party politics, it is important to draw a distinction 
from research on social movements (e.g. McCarthy and Zald 1977; Della Porta and Diani 
2006; Tarrow 2011). While this does offer some insights – as are noted throughout the 
article – the anti-EU ‘movement’ is defined by a negative, rather than a common interest 
and so social movement literature needs to be handled with care. Tarrow (1998) does 
identify a europeanization of popular contention, but this is grounded in a sub-set of 
actors, namely trade unions, that raise a question of general applicability. Moreover, the 
inclusion in this paper for political parties sets it apart from other studies, which tend to 
consider these as operating in a different political space, a view which seems particularly 
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inappropriate in this context, given the deep interaction between party and non-party 
groups and the limited structure for opposition in the EU (Neunreither 1998; Usherwood 
2002). 
In order to produce a robust catalogue of all groups that fall under the scope of this work, 
a multi-stage process was followed. Working from an initial survey of existing directories 
of groups – more common in the UK (e.g. European Movement 2000) than France – a 
new catalogue was built up, since such catalogues are incomplete or out-of-date. Firstly, 
all links on groups’ websites to other groups were followed and double-checked with 
general internet searches. Secondly, a systematic survey of academic literature on the 
two countries was examined for further group activity. Thirdly, there was a systematic 
survey of press media coverage, using the Lexis-Nexis database, for any and all 
references. This last element forms the basis for evaluating the active nature of a 
group’s opposition, as opposed to a simple declaration. 
In the first section of the paper, some theoretical approaches to the subject will be laid 
out. The starting point is the observation that most groups actively opposed to the EU do 
not have uniform interests across the range of Union activities. Instead, they almost all 
tend to focus on particular elements (be it institutions, policies or policy areas). This is 
most apparent in groups focused exclusively on one element (such as the anti-euro 
groups in the UK), but it also holds for those whose primary concern is withdrawal. This 
observation serves as a foundation for the construction of a framework that enables us 
to look at how the anti-EU movement has changed its focus, both in terms of the 
creation of new groups and shifts in the interests of existing ones. 
This is followed by an analysis and discussion of groups’ activities since the mid-1980s. 
France and the UK are used as illustrative case studies, reflecting as they do very 
different patterns of group formation and development. In France, most anti-EU activity 
has been found within political parties, while in the UK the focus has been much more on 
non-party groups; a difference that essentially reflects the differing institutional 
opportunity structures present in each national political system (c.f. Della Porta and 
Diani 2006). It is important to note the national specificities of the debate on the EU in 
the two countries do differ. This is most evident when looking at policy areas where 
national policy is divergent (e.g. the Euro), but for both the broad pattern of 
development and the more low-profile policy areas, there is much in common, and this is 
reflected in the formation and activity of groups: while they reflect national 
preoccupations, they are also fundamentally tied into the development of the Union itself, 
which cuts across national boundaries. The article therefore will draw attention to both 
similarities and divergences between the two cases. Indeed, in this analysis it will 
become apparent that anti-EU groups have been particularly interested in certain types 
of project, revealing themselves to be actors with clear awareness of their strengths and 
weaknesses and with a clear idea of the EU policy cycle. 
 
THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS 
‘Opposition to the European Union’ clearly covers a multitude of attitudes, interests and 
programmes of action. In order to access this variety, it is helpful to identify key 
elements that might shape the objects of opposition. This differs from the question of 
the strength of opposition, to which the article will return later and is discussed more 
fully elsewhere (e.g. Taggart & Szczerbiak 2001; Kopecky & Mudde 2002; Flood 2002; 
Skinner 2010; Vasilopoulou 2011). 
The ‘North Carolina School’ (Hooghe 2007; Hooghe & Marks 2007, 2009 Mudde 2011) 
focus on ideology as the determinant of groups’ positions on European integration, in 
order to differentiate potential underlying motivations. All groups have particular, 
localised concerns: every group dislikes the EU as it stands for some reason and that 
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reason will be reflected in particular points of friction. The reason can come from any 
number of quarters, but the effect is still the same. In practice, the main clusters of 
stated reasons tend to be located around individuals’ political economy, or to the 
psychological impact on their lives, or to the inadequacies of existing opposition groups 
(see Hooghe & Marks 2005). This is evident in the focus around specific clusters of 
policy-based opposition. Firstly, there are policies that have a clear economic impact on 
individuals, such as the Common Fisheries Policy. Secondly, there are policies that have 
symbolic importance, such as the use of metric measures in the UK. EMU falls 
somewhere in-between these two, given both its obvious economic impact and its 
psychological dimension (e.g. Risse et al. 1999). This division between economic and 
symbolic matches the variety of explanations put forward for public opinion: as Gabel 
(1998) has shown, utilitarian models offer a robust explanation of the latter. 
The left’s critique of integration clearly centres on a fear of a threat to its constituency 
and the basis for its national organisation (Halikiopoulou et al. 2012). Indeed, this might 
explain the somewhat ambiguous stance of the PCF in the mid-1990s, when it was 
opposed to EMU, but was in favour of European monetary stability (Greffet 2001). In the 
UK, the Labour Euro-Safeguard Campaign’s (n/d) opposition to EMU is founded on 
resultant cuts to public investment in the welfare state and the potential for increased 
unemployment in certain regions of the eurozone. But perhaps the most forceful 
example of the left’s critique of the integration comes from the Comité pour l’Abrogation 
du Traité de Maastricht (1999): 
‘For seven years, the people of Europe have had the painful experience of the 
application of the Maastricht treaty. No area has been untouched: privatised 
public services; land put in fallow to prevent the farmers from producing; 
fishermen stopped from fishing; young people, to whom one gives skilled work, 
unemployed; workers laid off; a dismantled system of social protection; wage 
moderation imposed by the European Central Bank on both the active and the 
retired; pension plans threatened; the educational system called into question.’ 
If the left is preoccupied with the effects of the EU on workers and welfare systems, then 
the right is concerned primarily with the question of sovereignty. On the far right, this 
manifests itself as opposition to the development of European policies on immigration 
and security and, in the French case, voting rights for EU nationals in elections.1 For the 
mainstream right, issues of national self-determination are prominent. For example, the 
Union Populaire Républicaine (2007) announces that ‘Frenchmen & women of all ages 
and backgrounds have decided to found a Popular Republican Union (UPR) in order to re-
establish France’s independence, to give the French people back their liberty, and to 
restore our country’s historic role as the spokesman for the liberty of people and of 
nations around the world’. Similarly, the Thatcherite Conservative Way Forward (n/d) 
holds as a principle that ‘[e]ach nation must be free to determine its policies to the 
benefit of its citizens’, an echo of Margaret Thatcher’s Bruges speech, where she held as 
her first guiding principle the idea that ‘willing and active co-operation between 
independent sovereign states is the best way to build a successful European Community’ 
(Thatcher 1998). Indeed, the four other principles that Thatcher outlined in her speech – 
practical Community policies, encouraging enterprise, avoiding protectionism and having 
a NATO-led defence – represent a checklist to which most right-wing groups in the UK – 
and, to a more limited extent, in France – could subscribe. 
While left and right have developed distinctive critiques of the European integration 
process, the endpoint is very similar for both sides, as noted by Liesbet Hooghe & Gary 
Marks (2009) and Daphne Halikiopoulou et al. (2012). One of the key problems of 
building opposition groups has been the lack of common ground between actors, firstly 
in agreeing what the problems are and secondly on the solutions to those problems. 
However, this should not overshadow the fact that, in practical terms, both left and right 
are able to find common ground in disliking particular elements of the European Union. 
The best examples of these common elements are also, almost by definition, the largest: 
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the Maastricht treaty, the Euro and the Constitutional Treaty. Certainly, the very size of 
these elements requires at least some response from either side, given the potential 
impact on Europe’s (and national) political economies. 
The overlap of left and right also helps to understand a third category, that of 
ideologically “neutral/indeterminate” in both countries. These can be divided into two 
main types. Firstly, there are those groups that fall under the “neutral” heading. This is 
to say that they have never elaborated a position beyond that of opposing the European 
Union for reasons unspecified. This includes umbrella groups, those groups that are 
trying to distance themselves from political parties (e.g. Alliance pour la Souveraineté de 
la France and Democracy Movement) and sectoral opposition groups (e.g. the Bruges 
Group). 
Secondly, there are those groups that are indeterminate in their position on a left-right 
spectrum, despite a more extensive elaboration of their position towards the European 
Union. These groups can be described as having a populist agenda, in the sense that 
they do not frame their programmes in anything more than a language of ‘common 
sense’, nor construct those programmes from first principles, as illustrated by the case of 
the UK Independence Party (UKIP 2010). 
This section can be summarised in the form of Table 1 below. This table highlights the 
main points on the matter of groups’ critiques, the objects of that critique and their form, 
on the basis of their position on a left-right spectrum. This emphasises that the main 
cleavage is not necessarily between left and right, but between those groups with clear 
ideological positions and those without. While left- and right-wing groups have different 
initial critiques, they share many of the same objects of those critiques and have very 
similar group form characteristics. By contrast, groups with a neutral or indeterminate 
position often lack fundamental critiques, have a more diverse set of EU elements that 
they oppose and almost entirely shun party forms. 
 
Table 1: Characteristics of groups classified by ideological standpoint 
 Left Neutral/Indeterminate Right 
Critique 
EU as threat to workers 
and to democratic 
system 
Often unclear or 
imprecise 
EU as threat to national 
sovereignty and 
independence 
Objects of Critique 
EMU, Maastricht, 
Constitutional Treaty, 
Internal Market 
EMU, Maastricht, 
Constitutional Treaty, 
sectoral policies 
EMU, Maastricht, 
Constitutional Treaty, 
immigration & asylum 
policy, defence policy 
Group Form 
Mainly party and intra-
party 
Mainly non-party Mainly party and intra-
party 
 
The taxonomy highlights the particular interests and focuses that individual groups 
possess (see the Appendix for a full listing of relevant groups in the UK and France). 
Regardless of ideological position or of suggested remedy, all anti-EU groups point out 
specific elements for their consideration. As has already been mentioned, the EU as a 
whole is too complex and too far-reaching for a generalised (in the sense of being non-
specific) opposition to be sustainable. This is true even in the case of the radical right, 
whose concerns usually centre on the primacy of EU law, human rights, immigration and 
Article 18 TFEU (non-discrimination on the basis of nationality) rights (e.g. British 
National Party n/d, Mouvement National Républicain n/d). 
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Moreover, there is also a separation of ideology and specific objects of opposition, as 
seen in Table 1. Groups have ideas about why they oppose the EU in its current form, 
often relating to wider ideologies or to specific economic concerns. This is important 
because if a specific object of opposition did not exist, then others would potentially take 
its place. This is not to suggest that groups will oppose the EU whatever it does, but 
rather that as the EU evolves, so different elements will change in importance for those 
groups. It must be questioned whether this holds true for all groups, especially those 
that have only narrow, sectoral concerns, since it may well be that prior to the 
development of that sectoral policy (and after its “successful” reform) that such groups 
are not mobilised at all. 
Consequently, we would expect the focus of opposition to the European Union to change 
over time. This is due to two, interrelated factors. Firstly, the EU is a system in a state of 
expansionary flux. This has been true since the start of the integration process in the 
1950s, but has become particularly marked in the period since the Single European Act, 
as exemplified by the succession of system-revising and –enlarging treaties. This is 
important because it has provided repeated new opportunities for anti-EU elements to 
become mobilised and work against those developments. This leads to the second factor, 
namely the separation between groups’ wider interests (ideological or economic) and the 
specific objects of their opposition. In the case of those groups that espouse ideological 
positions (in the broadest sense), it would be expected that the changing EU system will 
provide new specific policies and events that will draw such groups’ attention and activity. 
For those groups without such ideological positions, interest, mobilisation and activity 
will be driven by threats to economic well-being (for sectoral groups) or perceived 
resonance with wider constituencies (for populists). 
Consequently, when we look at the development of anti-EU opposition in France and the 
UK in the following section, we would expect to see shifts in focus on the part of groups 
with ideologies, as well as populist groups, alongside which there should be the 
development of new sectoral groups, reflecting the changing EU system. This will be 
operationalised in the first instance by considering the timeline for the foundation of 
anti-EU groups, since this almost always reflects the point of maximum mobilisation of 
individuals and resources: the only notable example of a group that formed during the 
period which developing significantly beyond its original base is UKIP. It is then further 
enriched with other data on groups’ activities. 
 
THE DEVELOPMENT OF OPPOSITION TO THE EU 
There is a clear evolution over time in the focus and practice of anti-EU activity. The 
concerns of the late 1980s differed from those of the early 1990s and both again from 
those of the present day. This is not to say that there is no continuity (witness the 
continuing struggle of Chasse-Pêche-Nature-Traditions (CPNT) over hunting directives, 
which span the entire time-frame), but rather that a significant proportion of anti-EU 
activity has moved in its focus over time. This is true for all of the different types of 
group outlined in the first section. As Figures 1 and 2 demonstrate, there has been a 
steady progression since the late 1980s, in terms of primary motivation for anti-EU 
group formation or commencement of anti-EU policy by pre-existing groups. 
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Figure 1: UK anti-EU groups by primary motivation for formation or commencement of 
anti-EU policy, 1989-2012 
 
 
Figure 2: French anti-EU groups by primary motivation for formation or commencement 
of anti-EU policy, 1989-2012 
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The data in these Figures is based on the lists in the Appendix, excluding only those 
groups that formed anti-EU platforms prior to 1989.2 It categorises groups on the basis 
of the primary motivation for their creation (for new groups) or commencement of an 
anti-EU platform (for pre-existing groups). Groups are only listed once, for simplicity: 
although this is somewhat reductionist, in practice it creates very few problems. The 
most obvious is the British Conservative Party, which is dated here at 1997 for 
commencing an anti-EU policy, since prior to this date there was no such official policy, 
notwithstanding Thatcher and Major’s assorted pronouncements: it was only once in 
opposition that year that the party would integrate that policy more fully. 
The overall pattern displayed in the data is one of a cyclical development of groups and 
their focus. The 1990s saw a large number of groups being mobilised in both countries, 
in response to the Maastricht Treaty and the ensuing project of EMU, followed by a 
slower pace of group activation. It is possible to link this changing volume to the parallel 
rise and fall in public interest in the EU as an issue that emerged through the 1990s (see 
Ipsos-Mori n/d for UK data), but just as evidently it can been seen that national debates 
on European integration have been the primary frame of reference. Thus, political 
ambivalence in the UK about first euro membership and then membership of the EU 
itself have provided fertile conditions for groups to develop as agents in the ensuing 
public debates, while in France the effective political space has focused much more 
around treaties and their ratification. As will be argued below, within this general 
understanding we can discern much specific patterns of activity within the policy-cycle, 
but it is important to note here that the topics (in the general sense) emerge from 
national contexts. 
The Figures also hide the consistent increase in the number of individuals mobilised in 
both cases. Since the mid-1990s there has always been at least one group in each 
country with a significant membership of active participants: The Referendum Party, 
Democracy Movement and then UKIP in the UK; the RPF and FN in France (Usherwood 
2004 provides data on this). Even as the organisational arrangements change, anti-EU 
groups appear to have been able to maintain the engagement of tens of thousands of 
people, thereby securing an important source of funding, labour and policy advocates. 
Beyond these general considerations, more specific comments can be made of a first set 
of groups – those with sectoral concerns - which are broken down into membership of 
the Euro and narrower policies in Figures 1 and 2. Here the shift in focus does not occur 
primarily within groups, but between them. Given that in no case has there been a 
reform of policy that satisfies any given sectoral group, over time there is an increasing 
number of relic organisations. Such groups still maintain a certain level of activities - 
especially if they represent an economically affected body of people - but in general 
terms such activities will not match the initial wave that follows a group’s foundation 
(see also Snow & Benford 1992). This is due in part to increasing costs (both financial 
and temporal), but also to the general lack of success that confronts those first attempts. 
This tends to result either in a hunkering-down, i.e. waiting for a more propitious window 
of opportunity, or in a deflection into more systemic opposition (see Neunreither 1998). 
Consequently, interest lies primarily with the creation of new sectoral groups. In this, it 
is the blossoming of numerous anti-EMU groups that is most visible. Despite EMU having 
being publicly discussed for several decades, not to mention officially negotiated since 
1988, it was only in 1997 that the first explicitly anti-EMU groups began to appear in the 
UK. The reason for this is clear enough: the election of the Labour government in that 
year suddenly brought the prospect of British membership much closer. However, in 
France it was to be 2001 before any group mobilised solely against the issue, despite 
French membership having been a political given from the outset. Nonetheless, the 
development of such groups in both countries does mark a clear change from the more 
parochial concerns of hunters, fishermen and supporters of imperial weights and 
measures, a development only underlined by the widespread mobilisation during the 
Constitutional Treaty process in the mid-2000s. In that case, there was a notable change 
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in approach, with anti-EU campaigners working alongside pro-EU groups to push for 
popular ratification of the Treaty, albeit with opposite outcomes in mind (e.g. Ivaldi 
2006). 
The second set of groups is that expressing identifiable positions on the ideological 
spectrum. As anticipated, these groups have shifted their focus of opposition during the 
study period, without noticeably shifting their ideological position. This is particularly 
apparent in France, where party-based groups have been most developed. The 
continuity of ideological position is evident in those groups created by, and centred on 
Philippe de Villiers. The aims of L’Autre Europe in the 1994 European elections (Gaullism 
and neo-nationalist positions) closely match those of today’s MPF. However, the objects 
of opposition have shifted. In 1994, the focus lay rather narrowly on opposing the single 
currency, Community preference in trade and retaining exclusive national citizenship, 
while today’s more comprehensive programme focuses on flexible cooperation, 
subsidiarity, migration and other home affairs matters (Benoit 1997: 59). Similarly, 
while Rassemblement Pour le Non was focused on foreigner’s voting rights and reduced 
border controls during the 1992 referendum, its ultimate successor, the Rassemblement 
pour la France et pour l’indépendance de l’Europe (RPFIE), now campaigns on economic 
growth, employment and federalism, while still retaining the Gaullist ideology of national 
sovereignty (Grunberg 2008). 
In the UK, the Labour Euro-Safeguards Campaign (LESC) dates back to the time of the 
first British application to join the European Economic Community in 1962. While no 
archival material exists back to this stage in the group’s existence, it is still possible to 
mark shifts in its interests since the late 1990s, through its regular bulletins (LESC n/d). 
During this period, the group has maintained a consistent interest in issues of 
transparency, corruption and the impact of integration on workers, but there has been a 
shift from discussion of British membership of the euro to debate on the functioning of 
the Eurozone and its impact on the UK. Moreover, the repeated cycles of treaty reform 
have also been marked by LESC, typically with an approach that each new stage of 
integration is either problematic for the UK or unworkable. The persistence of challenging 
British membership therefore finds expression and motive through a succession of 
specific policy and conjunctural occasions, allowing for a continual refreshing of an 
underlying conceptualisation. 
 
Figure 3: LESC Bulletin Topics, 1997-2012 (%) 
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The third and final set of groups that merits inspection here – groups with indeterminate 
ideological positions – presents similar characteristics to the previous set. Despite the 
lack of ideological cohesiveness, these groups still display a changing set of interests 
over time: indeed, these groups represent the only clear set of long-run data that is 
available, in terms of concrete outputs. This is illustrated by the examples of the Bruges 
Group and the European Foundation. In the case of the former, we can see a shift in the 
focus of the group’s activities by looking at its publications. The group has been one of 
the more prolific and consistent producers of anti-EU material during the 1990s and 
covers a wide range of issues (Bruges Group n/d). In the early years of its existence 
(roughly 1988-1991), the main focus was on the domestic politics that had helped to 
shape the group’s foundation, the Single Market, the Exchange Rate Mechanism and the 
Common Agricultural Policy. That focus has since shifted to economic governance, 
democratic legitimacy and trade policy. Indeed, as Figure 4 shows, it is possible to 
discern several waves over the past quarter-century, moving in time with the evolution 
of the Union itself. 
 
Figure 4: Publications of Bruges Group, 1989-2012, by main topic (%) 
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IMPLICATIONS OF THE SHIFT IN FOCUS 
The evidence that is available clearly points towards changes over time. The nature and 
scope of this shift bears some further discussion, since it reveals some important aspects 
of the opposition movement. The first observation is that groups frequently appear to 
highlight issues that receive very little interest elsewhere at that time. From imperial 
weights and measures to Corpus Juris to regionalisation, anti-EU groups have been very 
active in picking up, and raising the public profile of, many seemingly technical points: 
the European Foundation (n/d) is the most recent proponent of this approach. This 
warrants several comments itself. Perhaps most importantly, it reveals a characteristic of 
many such groups, namely a tendency to catastrophise. What ties together these diverse 
points is their position as gateways into whole new fields of EU activity. Metrification is 
seen as the end of distinctive national cultures and practices, Corpus Juris opened the 
way to a single legal system and regionalisation the end of national governments. This 
highly teleological approach results from the strong sub-current in anti-EU thought – the 
creation of ‘a country called Europe’ – which is particularly prevalent in the UK (see 
Gowland et al. 2010). European integration is seen as a process with a clear end-point 
that will be achieved by hook or by crook. Hence, it is the duty of anti-EU groups to 
highlight when such developments occur, otherwise the door will have been opened and 
it will be too late. 
This leads to a second comment, concerning levels of knowledge. In order for such a 
watchtower role to be effective, groups need to possess a clear sight of what is actually 
happening in the EU. One of the major developments within the movement since the 
1990s has been precisely such an autonomous capacity to accumulate, evaluate and 
disseminate information. This is seen in the creation of umbrella groups, which create 
webs of contacts between individuals and groups, on both national and European levels 
and of specialised research driven groups, such as the European Foundation or Global 
Britain. In so doing, the anti-EU movement has been highly successful in optimising its 
resources, to its lasting benefit. 
The second overall observation concerns the point of concentration of groups’ activities 
during the policy cycle. This is most apparent with major policy developments, such as 
the Maastricht treaty, EMU or the Constitutional Treaty, which had long cycles of 
discussion, negotiation and implementation (see Figures 1 and 2). As was noted in the 
first section of this paper, such large projects tend to draw the attention of anti-EU 
groups, albeit for a wide variety of ideological and practical reasons, not least of which is 
a desire to remain relevant actors in the evolving (if generally weak) public debate. 
However, given the restraints on resources that most opposition groups face, it is 
necessary for them to focus their efforts where they are likely to have the greatest 
impact, rather than employing a scattergun approach.3 In practical terms, this means 
that groups are most active in the policy-making cycle before decisions are completed 
(an observation that reinforces Rochon & Mazmanian’s (1993) findings on the relative 
ease of inclusion into new policies, as compared to policy change; see also Meyer 2004). 
More particularly, groups appear to be interested in pushing their preferences at two 
clear points in the cycle. The first has already been discussed above, namely when policy 
ideas are first floated: here it might be expected that policy preferences are relatively 
open and unfixed, giving opposition groups the opportunity to create a credible 
alternative pole to any incipient policy development. If this occurs right at the beginning 
of the policy-cycle, then the second main area comes significantly later. While the anti-
EU movement is more convinced than most of the reality of a European superstate, as 
discussed before, then there is also a very realist approach to the role of national 
governments and parliaments. In both countries, groups focus much of their attention 
and efforts on influencing national politicians, as most vividly demonstrated in 1992-3 by 
the wave of opposition to Maastricht. Then, opposition was not directed at the IGCs that 
had preceded the final text, but rather at national ratification processes: This was also 
clearly the case with other member states (Denmark, Germany, etc.) and with other 
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treaty ratifications (e.g. Amsterdam in France, Nice and Lisbon in Ireland, etc.). The 
need for unanimous ratification opens up the EU system to political actors who are less 
likely to be socialised into that system or less concerned about the need for its 
development, especially if it comes at the perceived price of a reduced role for those 
national actors (see Hobolt 2007 and Glencross and Trechsel 2011). 
This strategy reached its apotheosis with the defeat of the Constitutional Treaty in the 
2005 referenda in France and the Netherlands. The Convention on the Future of Europe 
failed to generate much interest on the part of anti-EU groups, at least those not directly 
involved (see Usherwood 2007). It might appear strange that opposition groups push 
most where there was the best access to the decision-making process, especially given 
the Convention’s approach, but it reflected the inevitable ratification that would have to 
follow the Convention, particularly given the pressure that resulted in a proliferation of 
national referenda (including France and the UK). By using arguments demanding more 
democracy, pro-referenda campaigners (both pro- and anti-EU) were able to side-step 
traditional barriers to their involvement (see Laursen 2008). Even if French voters were 
motivated as much as by concerns over domestic politics as the Treaty itself (Krouwel & 
Startin 2013), it still represented a major achievement for anti-EU elements, albeit one 
tempered by the re-emergence of the Treaty’s substance in the Lisbon Treaty. 
Similar issues and factors were also apparent when looking at anti-EMU opposition in the 
UK. During the Maastricht ratification, EMU played a relatively minor role in groups’ 
critiques, largely because of the opt-out that had already been secured and instead 
broader issues of national sovereignty and the loss of parliamentary rights predominated 
(Baker et al. 1994). However, as the 1997 general election loomed – with its anticipated 
switch to an ostensibly pro-EMU Labour government – so anti-EMU groups began to 
crystallise. First there was the effort of the Referendum Party to monopolise the issue 
from the start. Its failure to secure a parliamentary majority (or indeed any seats) was 
balanced by its success in gaining assurances from all sides of a referendum on 
membership, which resulted in a slew of groups being formed from 1997 onwards to 
organise any ‘no’ campaign. 
In France, the strong political commitment to EMU membership on both right and left (as 
seen in the 1997 Assemblée elections) essentially stifled anti-EU groups playing on the 
issue after Maastricht ratification had been secured (Stone 1993). Certainly, the anti-
EMU groups that sprang up in 2001 were very small and had only a marginal public 
profile, lacking as they did the broader support of the anti-EU movement as a whole.4 
This reflects a more general perception across opponents of the Union that it is much 
easier to change policy that has yet to be implemented than it is policy that already 
exists as part of the status quo: certainly, in the UK it is not uncommon for the failure to 
win the 1975 referendum on continued British membership of the EEC to be attributed to 
this point. This relates back to the point made previously about limited resources, but 
also to how anti-EU groups perceive their opportunity structures. 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
This paper has tried to demonstrate that opposition to the European Union is a dynamic 
phenomenon, which requires a full understanding of the various interests and 
motivations of those involved. It has shown that there have been both macro- and 
micro-level shifts in focus by anti-EU groups, resulting from the interplay of the evolving 
EU system and the overarching ideologies that many groups hold. Together, these 
factors drive opposition groups to continually modify their activities, in order to maximise 
their influence. 
As was noted in the previous section, opposition groups present certain features in 
common in this respect. They are much more alert to any potential structural expansion 
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of the European Union than either the general public or even elites (who have 
traditionally been seen as drivers of integration): the anti-EU information dissemination 
infrastructure across Europe is one of the most developed outside of government and 
academic circles. Moreover, anti-EU groups appear to have adopted a rational strategy of 
maximising their limited resources to focus on policies and points in the policy cycle 
when they have the best opportunity to exercise some leverage. In this, they resemble 
other instances of social movements engaged in ‘contentious politics’ (Tarrow 2011). 
This is not only true for groups’ focuses, but also from their strategies. One example will 
suffice to illustrate this point. UKIP has adapted itself since its foundation in 1992 to its 
changing circumstances, most notably in its electoral strategy. Initially, the party had a 
clear policy of not accepting any seats that it might win in the European Parliament, as a 
mark of its lack of constitutionality: Money normally paid to MEPs would be returned to 
the taxpayer. However, from 1997 onwards, following a change in leadership, party 
policy changed so as to accept seats in the Parliament, in order to gain a platform, 
expose fraud and mismanagement and report on the EU’s activities: MEPs would only 
take minimum expenses and give the rest to help fund anti-EU activities. Since the 
party’s successes from 1999 onwards, even this cautious policy has been pushed further 
aside, as new opportunities have presented themselves. This shift reflects a shift in the 
nature of what the party was trying to do: essentially, the failure of a fundamentalist 
approach helped to generate the shift to a more realistic strategy (see Usherwood 2006 
and 2008 for an elaboration of this ‘fundi/realo’ dilemma). 
In brief, our understanding of anti-EU groups needs to move away from pejorative 
models of opposition as a necessary residual part of the population that is impossible to 
accommodate within the Union system and to start recognising that such groups are not 
only a necessary consequence of integration, but that they can also shed light upon the 
process. By studying their actions and interests, it is possible to discern where the active 
boundaries of the integration process lie: groups tend to focus on those areas where the 
EU presents a credible and consequential policy. For instance, there are no groups 
opposed to a Union foreign policy, and are unlikely to be until such a policy develops 
further. By recognising this fundamental link between the Union and its opponents, we 
might improve our understanding of both. 
 
*** 
 
 
                                                 
1 Nicholas Startin (1997: 103) noted these three areas as the main focuses of the Front National during 
the 1990s. The British National Party discusses membership primarily as a block to political and 
economic freedom, but also implies a repatriation of immigration policies as a priority. The BNP’s 
opposition to the EU is best seen as a strategic choice, designed to bolster public support, but which also 
allows the party to achieve other goals (Ford & Goodwin 2010). 
2 These groups are: Anti Common Market League, British National Party, Conservative European Reform 
Group, Green Party and National Front, in the UK; Ligue Communiste Révolutionnaire and Lutte Ouvrier 
in France. 
3 Resources in both France and the UK, in both financial and leadership terms, have tended to be 
concentrated in the hands of a relatively small number of people (e.g. Paul Sykes, James Goldsmith, 
Philippe de Villiers, Jean-Paul Bled, etc.). Other sources of funding (from the state for French parties, 
and from small private contributions in the UK) have proved irregular and unreliable for the most part, 
hence partly explaining the high level of coordination of anti-EU work in both countries. 
4 Interviews with RPF and MPF officials in 2002 indicated that they saw the issue as come-and-gone and 
so did not merit their particular interest. 
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APPENDIX 
Anti-EU groups in France and the UK classified by ideological position and group form. 
 
Party 
Left 
UK 
Communist Party of Britain (1988/(1991)-) 
Green Party (1974-) 
Respect (2004-) 
 
France 
Front de gauche (2008-) 
Ligue Communiste Révolutionnaire (1974-) 
Lutte Ouvrier (1939-) 
Mouvement des Citoyens (1991-2002) 
Mouvement républicain et citoyen (2003-) 
Nouveau Parti anticapitaliste (2009-) 
Parti Communiste Française (1943/(1991)-) 
Parti de gauche (2008-) 
Parti ouvrier indépendant (2008-) 
 
Neutral / 
Indeterminate 
UK 
Anti-Federalist League (1991-1992) 
Democratic Party (1998-2005) 
Freedom Democrats (2011-) 
Have Your Say (2012-) 
Referendum Party (1994-1997) 
UK Independence Party (1992-) 
Veritas (2002-) 
 
France Libertas (2009-)  
Right 
UK 
British National Party (1982-) 
Conservative Party (1834/(1997)-) 
National Democrats (1995-2011) 
National Front (1967-) 
 
France 
Chasse-Pêche-Nature-Traditions (1989-) 
Demain la France (1996-1999) 
Front National (1974/(1988)-) 
L’Autre Europe (1994-1994) 
Mouvement National Républicain (1999-) 
Mouvement pour la France (1994-) 
Parti de la France (2009-) 
Rassemblement pour la France et l’Independence de l’Europe (1999-) 
Rassemblement pour l'indépendance de la France (2003-) 
Souveraineté, indépendance et libertés (2011-) 
 
Note: Dates of operation for each group are as follows: year of establishment/(year of start of active EU 
policy, if later than establishment) – year of end of operations (if applicable). Source: groups’ websites 
and literature. 
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Intra-party 
Left 
UK 
Labour Against the Euro (2003-2004) 
Labour Euro Safeguards Campaign (1995-) 
People’s Europe Campaign (1996-1997) 
Trade Unions Against the Single Currency (1997-2002) 
 
France 
Comité national pour la Non à la Constitution européenne (2005-
2005) 
 
Neutral UK & France -- 
Right 
UK 
Anti Common Market League (1961-2009) 
Conservative European Reform Group (1980-1993) 
Conservative Way Forward (1991-) 
Conservatives Against a Federal Europe (1996-) 
Fresh Start Group (2012-) 
Get Britain Out (2009-) 
 
France 
Combat pour les Valeurs (1991-1994) 
Debout la République (1999) 
Rassemblement pour le Non (1991) 
 
 
Non-party 
Left 
UK 
Campaign Against Euro-Federalism (1992-) 
No2EU – Yes to Democracy (2009-) 
 
France Comité pour l’Abrogation du Traité de Maastricht (1997-1999) 
 
Neutral / 
Indeterminate 
UK 
Anti Maastricht Alliance (1993-2003) 
Alliance against the European Constitution (2004-2005) 
British Weights and Measures Association (1995-) 
Bruges Group (1989-) 
Business for Sterling (1998-2000) 
Campaign for an Independent Britain (1989-) 
Congress for Democracy (1998-2008) 
Democracy Movement (1998-) 
EU Referendum Campaign (2009-2010) 
European Foundation (1993-) 
Federation of Small Businesses (1974/(1990)-) 
Global Britain (1998-) 
New Alliance (1997-2008) 
New Europe (1997-2000) 
No (1999-2001) 
Open Europe (2005-) 
People’s No Campaign (2005-2005) 
People’s Pledge (2011-) 
Save Britain’s Fish (1990-2003) 
Vote No (2004-2005) 
Vote UK Out of EU (2010-) 
Youth Against the European Union (1995-1998) 
Youth For a Free Europe (1999-2005) 
 
France 
Alliance pour la Souveraineté de la France (1998-2002) 
Etats Généraux de la Souveraineté Nationale (1998-1998) 
 
Right 
UK 
Britain Out of Europe Campaign (2002-2002) 
European Research Group (1993-2001) 
The Freedom Association (1975/(1991)-) 
 
France 
Action Française (1898/(1991)-) 
Combats souverainistes (2001-2002) 
Demain la France (1991-1996) 
Gardons le Franc (2001-2001) 
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